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JUVENILE TRANSFER IN ILLINOIS
Through its Juvenile Court Act,' Illinois, like
every other state in the Union, has established a
separate judicial system for dealing with the prob-
lems of juveniles. 2 Simply because of his status as a
juvenile, the child in trouble with the law is accorded
a number of special statutory rights which are not
similarly available to adult offenders. 3 The statute
requires that special treatment be given to juveniles
who are taken into custody by law enforcement
officers. 4 In an effort to protect a minor's privacy,
'ILL REV. STAT. ch. 37, §§ 701-1 to 708-4 (1975).
2There are four basic kinds of proceedings which are
conducted under the Illinois Juvenile Court Act, and in this
respect the Illinois statute is representative ofjuvenile court
acts and juvenile codes in other jurisdictions. The Illinois
juvenile court is to have cognizance of proceedings "con-
cerning boys and girls who are delinquent, otherwise in
need of supervision, neglected, or dependent . ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 37 § 702-1 (1975).
A "dependent" minor is one under 18 who is without a
guardian, parent or custodian, or who is not receiving
proper care because of the mental or physical disability of
his parent, guardian, or custodian, or whose parent,
guardian or custodian wishes to terminate parental rights
and responsibilities in order to allow the child to be
adopted. Id. § 702-5. A "neglected" minor is one under age
18 who is not receiving proper support, education, or
medical care from his parents, guardian or custodian, or
who has been abandoned, or whose environment is injuri-
ous to his welfare. Id. § 702-4. A "minor in need of
supervision" (commonly called "MINS") is one under 18
who cannot be controlled by his parents, guardian, or
custodian, or who is habitually truant or addicted to drugs.
Id. § 702-3.
A "delinquent" minor is one who "prior to his 17th
birthday has violated or attempted to violate . . . any
federal or state law or municipal ordinance .... " Id. §
702-2. In other words, delinquency proceedings are insti-
tuted against offenders under 17 years of age who are
charged with having committed criminal acts. Transfer to
adult court relates only to juveniles who are charged with
delinquency. It must be constantly kept in mind that the
Supreme Court's juvenile justice decisions (see text accom-
panying notes 52-99, infra) have extended constitutional
procedural protections only to juveniles brought up on
delinquency proceedings, not to MINS, neglect or depend-
ency actions.
'These Illinois provisions are representative of similar
provisions in juvenile court statutes in other jurisdictions.
4ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37 §§ 702-8, 703-1, 2 (1975).
Minors under 16 may not be confined in jail or police
station detention facilities which are also used for adults.
Minors under 17 must be kept separate from confined
juvenile court proceedings are not open to the
public,' and the records of the court are kept from
public scrutiny. 8 An adjudication of delinquency does
not constitute a criminal conviction: a youth who is
the subject of delinquency proceedings is not deemed
to be a criminal, nor does he acquire a criminal
record . 7 Because a minor's brush with the law is often
regarded as the product of peer pressure or youthful
exuberance, adjudication of delinquency does not
disqualify a person from holding public office at a
later time, nor does it bring forfeiture of any civil
right or privilege. 8 Adjudications, dispositions, and
evidence admitted in proceedings of the juvenile court
may not later be used against the juvenile as evidence
in any other court. 9 By largely eliminating the
possibility of public scrutiny, the legislature has
attempted to protect the child from being haunted in
later life by the spectre of his youthful mistakes.
In addition to these protective benefits, the juvenile
court provides a graduated range of options for
correcting a child's antisocial behavior. In Illinois,
if at an adjudication hearing a child has been for-
mally found to be delinquent, a separate hearing is
held to determine the appropriate "disposition" of
his case, i.e., the mode of correction to which he
should be subjected. 10 All corrections within the
adults in the same facility. Photographs and fingerprints of
minors under 17 may not be shared with other law
enforcement agencies. Police records of all minors under 17
must be maintained separate from arrest records of adults
and may not be disclosed for public inspection unless by
court order. Police are authorized to take minors into
temporary custody without a warrant but this is not deemed
to constitute an arrest nor is a police record thereby
acquired. When a minor is taken into custody without a
warrant by a law enforcement officer, the officer is charged
with the duty of immediately making a reasonable attempt
to notify the minor's parent or guardian. Without unneces-
sary delay the officer is to take the minor to the nearest
juvenile police officer or designated reception center for
juveniles.




"0The purpose of an adjudicatory hearing is to deter-
mine whether allegations that a minor is delinquent are
proved beyond a reasonable doubt and also to ascertain
juvenile court system are based upon the fundamen-
tal theory that a child is to be given rehabilitative
treatment to correct his attitudes and behavior.
Unlike the adult criminal system, where vestigial
traces of retribution theory may still be detected, the
delinquent child is not to be punished for his
wrongdoings. " Wide flexibility exists in the juvenile
system to provide treatment which is geared to the
needs and problems of the individual juvenile of-
fender. 1
It may be thought that the presence of a juvenile
court act on a state's statute books symbolizes its
commitment to the proposition that, in all cases, a
minor's welfare can best be served by adjudication
and treatment as a juvenile. All juveniles, however,
are not automatically to be tried as juveniles until
they reach the statutory age for criminal court
jurisdiction. In the interest of protecting the safety
and welfare of the community, nearly every state has
devised some mechanism by which the recalcitrant
juvenile, or the juvenile charged with a particularly
well-publicized crime, can be brought into the
criminal court and tried as an adult. A number of
terms have been used to describe this process:
"waiver" of juvenile court jurisdiction, "transfer" to
criminal court, "certification" to stand trial as an
adult, or "removal" to criminal court. But all pertain
to the same decision to relinquish juvenile court
jurisdiction over a minor who is accused of commit-
ting an act which violates the criminal laws.
The consequences of waiver are of enormous
significance to the juvenile. He is compelled to forfeit
the statutory rights and benefits which are accorded
to him under juvenile court jurisdiction. If convicted
in criminal court, he will have accumulated a
criminal record which will follow him for the rest of
his life. He will also face the prospect of incarceration
for a longer period of time in an institution where he
whether the minor should be adjudged to be a ward of the
juvenile court. Id. § 701-4. The purpose of a dispositional
hearing is to determine "what order of disposition should be
made in respect of a minor adjudged to be a ward of the
court." Id. § 701-10.
"See text accompanying notes 15-21, infra.
"A minor in Illinois who is adjudicated delinquent may
be placed on probation and released to the custody of his
parents, placed under the guardianship of another person or
agency, with or without probation, committed to a licensed
training or industrial school, admitted for treatment for
drug addiction, committed to the state's Department of
Children and Family Services, or committed to the Juvenile
Division of the Department of Corrections. ILL. REv. STAT.
ch. 37 § 705-2(I)(a)(1)-(5) (1975).
may well be subject to attack and abuse by adult
inmates. 3
The fundamental purpose and policy of the juve-
nile court in Illinois is to "serve the moral, emo-
tional, mental, and physical welfare of the minor
and the best interests of the community .... , 14 A
transfer hearing often brings these two fundamental
objectives into direct confrontation with one another.
In juvenile transfer, the public policy favoring pro-
tective and rehabilitative treatment for youthful of-
fenders must be balanced against the need of society
to be protected from persons-including young per-
sons-who commit acts which threaten the safety
and security of the public. Because humanitarian
ideals have been so openly heralded in the juvenile
court system, the opposing societal interests have
often not been clearly recognized.
This comment seeks to analyze the nature and
degree of due process protection accorded tojuveniles
in transfer proceedings in Illinois. To more fully
understand the juvenile court as it exists today in
Illinois and in other states, it is helpful to review the
history and ideals of thejuvenile court movement and
to study the recent pronouncements of the United
States Supreme Court in the field of juvenile justice.
I.
The genesis of the modern juvenile court" can be
traced to Illinois. On April 21, 1899, Illinois became
"Juvenile court jurisdiction terminates at age 18. This
means that regardless of the offense, a juvenile cannot be
incarcerated beyond his eighteenth birthday, while an adult
convicted of violating the same law faces a statutorily
prescribed sentence.
" Id. § 701-2(1). A similar provision is included in the
juvenile court acts of most other states.
"The society which produced the juvenile court idea
was caught in the throes of enormously powerful social
forces not previously encountered in the American experi-
ence. A basically agrarian nation, being traniformed under
the impact of industrialization and improved transporta-
tion, was struggling to absorb wave after wave of European
immigration into its burgeoning cities. A revolution was
being worked in American life, but not without great
human cost.
The thild in trouble was regarded by socially conscious
individuals as being an innocent casualty of a system totally
beyond his control. Perceiving that a system of criminal law
founded upon concepts of deterrence and punishment had
not stopped the spread of crime, high-minded reformers
focused upon social conditions as the fundamental cause of
crime. What was needed was individualized treatment and
moral re-education, and to these ends, children were
thought to be particularly well-suited.
The early reformers joined forces with the rising social
science movement, which pledged that human problems
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the first state to enact a juvenile court act, and within
two months Cook County opened the doors of the
nation's first juvenile court. Although the Illinois
statute 16 did not provide for the creation of a new
court, it did for the first time consolidate in one
forum cases involving the dependency, neglect and
delinquency of children.
The juvenile court idea became enormously popu-
lar, and the movement swept the country in the early
decades of the twentieth century.' 7 The juvenile
court, born of a belief that a child could not be a
criminal, was designed to function outside the crimi-
nal justice system. Salvation through treatment, not
punishment, was its goal; benevolence, not due
process, its procedure. To symbolize the separation
of juvenile court proceedings from criminal proce-
could be solved by a proper application of scientific
methodology and technique. Together they determined to
work out a plan of salvation for the child in trouble.
Up to this time, the youthful offender was tried in
criminal court, just like an adult, although the child was
given the benefit of several historic presumptions. At
common law, a child under seven years of age was
presumed to be incapable of entertaining the intent neces-
sary for criminal responsibility. (However, by the late
nineteenth century some states had reduced the age for
criminal responsibility to as low as seven. Mack, The
Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REV. 104,106 (1909) [herein-
after cited as Mack]). Between the ages of seven and
fourteen, he was likewise presumed incapable of criminal
intent, but this presumption could be rebutted upon a show-
ing that the individual child possessed the capacity to under-
stand the consequences of his behavior. See PI.ESIDENT'S
COMMISSION ON LAw ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION
OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: JUVENILE DELIN-
QUENCY AND YOUTH CRIME, 2 (1967) [hereinafter cited
as TASK FORCE REPORT]. The child was prosecuted ex-
actly as an adult would be, and if found guilty, would be
similarly punished.
The child was arrested, put into prison, indicted by
the grand jury, tried by a petit jury, under all the
forms and technicalities of our criminal law, with the
aim of ascertaining whether it had done the specific
act-nothing else-and if it had, then of visiting the
punishment of the state upon it.
Mack, supra, at 106.
It was the prospect of incarceration of children with
adult criminals which first aroused the conscience of social
reformers, and the final push for a separate juvenile court
system was preceded by the successful establishment in a
number of states of separate confinement facilities for
juveniles, which emphasized rehabilitative training and
treatment rather than punishment. TASK FORCE REPORT,
supra, at 3.
'"Juvenile Court Act [1899] I1. Laws 131.
17Within twelve years of the enactment of the Illinois
statute, twenty-two other states had followed suit. TASK
FORCE REPORT, supra note 15, at 3.
dures, a new procedural terminology was developed
for the juvenile system. 8 To protect the child from
the glare of publicity and to maximize the effective-
ness of the treatment plan devised by the court's
social workers and psychologists, hearings were not
to be public, and all records were to be kept
scrupulously confidential. Trial by jury was regarded
as "inconsistent with both the law and the theory
upon which the children's codes [were] founded." '9
Born in large measure of a desire to separate the
youthful offender from the deleterious effects of
exposure to hardened criminals, flexible, individual-
ized dispositions became the hallmark of the juvenile
system. The juvenile court judge had wide-ranging
discretion to select from an array of suitable options
in constructing an appropriate, individualized plan
to rehabilitate an erring child. He could
dismiss the case, warn the juvenile, fine him, place
him on probation, arrange for restitution, refer him to
an agency or treatment facility, or commit him to an
institution. "
Probation, however, was conceived to be "the key-
note of the juvenile-court legislation."21
Yet there remained at the heart of the movement a
gnawing constitutional dilemma: how could this
separate system of courts for delinquent children
exist without the safeguards that were guaranteed in
criminal proceedings by the Constitution of the
United States? The movement's advocates avoided
the constitutional issue by embellishing upon the
doctrine of parens patriae. This concept traces back
to the English chancery courts, which, in the name of
the King (pater patriae), were charged with exercis-
ing protective jurisdiction over the property interests
of all the children in the realm. When chancery
courts were established in America, their jurisdiction
was extended to protect children who were victims of
neglect or abandonment. The turn-of-the-century
reformers sought to extend to children in trouble
with the criminal law the benefits of a court already
exercising protective equitable jurisdiction over juve-
niles. 22Their goal was to deal with juvenile offenders
181d.
"CCHILDREN'S BUREAU (Pub. No. 121), JUVENILE
COURT STANDARDS 5 (1928).
"0TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 15, at 5.
"Mack, supra note 15, at 116.
2 Professor Monrad G. Paulsen has noted that social
reformers frankly did not "mind that the doctrine of the
crown as parens patriae had [historically] been applied
only to protect children in respect to their property against
the acts of greedy adults or to assure a child a proper
"as a wise and merciful father." 2 They viewed the
child as being essentially good, and thus particularly
amenable to being saved and rehabilitated at the
hands of a benevolent and kindly state.
The child, unlike the adult, was deemed to have no
right to liberty in the constitutional sense. He was
instead entitled'to a right to custody in which he
could grow and develop. And where this protective
and nurturing custody could not be effectively pro-
vided by the natural parent, the state was obligated
to step in.24
The juvenile court, then, was to save and to rescue,
not to punish. It was emphatically not a criminal
court, and therefore the Constitution's guarantees of
proceduril due process became irrelevant. It became
popular to express this idea by defining juvenile
court proceedings as "civil" and not "criminal" in
nature . 2 5 It was because juvenile proceedings were
designed to be "informal" and "non-adversary" that
the lawyer was almost completely excluded from the
juvenile courtroom. 2 The dominant role in repre-
upbringing." Although the parens patrae concept had
never before been used "to immunize a child against the
consequences of criminal conduct," nevertheless in the eyes
of the reformers, "lilt was close enough to do a job."
Paulsen, Kent v. United States: The Constitutional Context
of Juvenile Cases, 1966 Sup. CT. REV. 167, 173 [herein-
after cited as Paulsen].
23Mack, supra note 15, at 107.2 4Judge Mack declared that the child was
to be taken in hand by the state, not as an enemy but
as a protector, as the ultimate guardian, because...
the unwillingness or inability of the natural parents to
guide [the child] toward good citizenship . . . com-
pelled the intervention of the public authorities.
Id.
2This view was devastatingly refuted by the majority
opinion in In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 50-51 (1967). See text
accompanying notes 81-91, infra.
2'An article written in 1950 by two third-year students
at the University of Pittsburgh School of Law began by
noting that although there was little offered in the law
school curriculum to acquaint students with the methods
and goals of the juvenile court, such knowledge was not
really very necessary because "[tlhe lawyer is less likely to
face a situation involving a juvenile court proceeding [in
that] many such cases are disposed of without benefit of
counsel." The authors went on to note that the rare
occasions when a lawyer was called upon to practice in the
juvenile court could indeed be
a source of embarrassment and loss of prestige to the
lawyer. His objections may be perfectly valid under
the ordinary rules of procedure, and yet be wholly
inapplicable in the proceedings in which he is
involved,
Ellrod and Melany, Juvenile Justice: Treatment or Trav-
esty? 11 U. PiTT. L. REV. 277 (1950).
In describing the philosophy of the early pioneers of the
juvenile court movement, the President's Commission con-
cluded:
senting the child's interests was to be played by the
social worker, not the lawyer. These fundamental
assumptions were by and large to control the
operations of the juvenile court system for the next
sixty years.
II.
From the early days of the movement, the juvenile
court idea was not without critics who were con-
vinced that the absence of constitutional protections
could in no way be justified, particularly in delin-
quency proceedings. In 1905 the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court was confronted with a challenge to
the constitutionality of that state's Juvenile Court
Act. 27 It was argued that juvenile court proceedings
violated the due process clause and denied the right
to jury trial on criminal charges. The court summar-
ily dismissed these contentions by declaring that the
due process clause and the right to jury trial applied
only in criminal proceedings and the juvenile system
had been created to spare children the hardships of
criminal trials. In heady language, the court went on
to defend the ideals and procedures adopted in the
juvenile system. 28
Lawyers were unnecessary-adversary tactics were
out of place, for the mutual aim of all was not to
contest or object but to determine the treatment plan
best for the child. That plan was to be devised by the
increasingly popular psychologists and psychiatrists;
delinquency was thought of almost as a disease to be
diagnosed by specialists and the patient kindly but
firmly dosed.
TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 15, at 3.
Noting the vigor with which the movement's founders
banished the lawyer from the juvenile courtroom, a leading
contemporary juvenile court judge declared:
In the exuberant belief that court-ordered social
service was the answer to all the ills of youth, law was
forgotten and lawyers were summarily dismissed from
the hallowed halls of the children's court to assure that
salvation, lilac scent and the social-work supervisor
would reign supreme.
Ketcham, Legal Renaissance in the Juvenile Court, 60
Nw. U. L. REV. 585,586 (1965).
2"Commonwealth v. Fisher, 213 Pa. 48, 62 A. 198
(1905).
28 [The Juvenile Court Act] is not for the punishment
of offenders but for the salvation of children . . .
whose salvation may become the duty of the state ....
No child ... is excluded from its beneficient
provisions. Its protecting arm is for all . . . who may
need its protection.
To save a child from becoming a criminal, or from
continuing in a career of crime . . . the Legislature
surely may provide for the salvation of such a child
. . . by bringing it into one of the courts of the state
without any process at all, for the purpose of subject-
ing it to the state's guardianship and protection....
[T]he state, when compelled as parens patriae, to take
COMMENTS [Vol. 67
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A prophetic critical view was expressed in a note
published in the Columbia Law Review in 1927.
The student author observed that in spite of both the
social science emphasis to be found in delinquency
proceedings and "the attempt to make such a trial
civil by calling it ciVil,'" 29 delinquency proceedings
nevertheless retained a great deal of the flavor of a
criminal trial. Since a child faced the possibility of
restraint both before and after an adjudication of
delinquency, he was in reality subject to a depriva-
tion of liberty. The author suggested that such depri-
vation was being effected without due process of law:
"wide opportunity for arbitrary injustice in the
juvenile court because of informal hearings is pain-
fully apparent." 30 It was recommended that "consti-
tutional guarantees. . . be retained as a check on the
danger of unintentional oppression resulting from
the misuse or abuse of the juvenile court machin-
ery."
3 1
In a time of American social turbulence, criticism
of the juvenile court system became genuinely wide-
spread. In the period following World War II, some
began to express doubt that the parens patriae
philosophy could adequately protect the public from
what was perceived as an onslaught of juvenile
criminality.12 Others simultaneously expressed a
the place of the father ... [is not] required to adopt
any process as a means of placing its hand upon the
child to lead it into one of its courts. When the child
gets there, and the court, with the power to save it,
determines on its salvation, and not its punishment, it
is immaterial how it got there.
Id. at 53, 62 A. at 199, 200.
An article appearing in 1926 took the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court's decision severely to task, suggesting that
the court turned its back on the Constitution in order to
appease the mass of public opinion which had rallied
behind the enactment of the juvenile court statute. It was
only by artful evasion that the court had been able to avoid
concluding that many provisions of the Pennsylvania
Juvenile Court Act were clearly unconstitutional. Chil-
dren's Commission of Pennsylvania, The Legal Founda-
tions of the Jurisdiction, Powers, Organization, and Proce-
dures of the Courts of Pennsylvania in Their Handling of
Cases of Juvenile Offenders and of Dependent and Ne-
glected Children, 1926 ANNALS 28.
29Note, Rights of Juveniles to Constitutional Guarantees
in Delinquency Proceedings, 27 COLUM. L. REV. 968,
970 (1927).
3 0Id. at 974.
311d.
32 Infants under the age of 21 years, according to sta-
tistics, perpetrate a high percentage of the heinous
crimes committed throughout the country, and the
situation has reached such serious proportions that it
is a threat to the public welfare and safety of law-
abiding citizens.... [Tihe time has come to examine
the underlying philosophy of the treatment of ju-
venile offenders.
reaction against the virtually unchecked discretion of
the juvenile court, with the resulting potential for
abuse and arbitrariness.33 Skepticism regarding the
theoretical validity and effectiveness of juvenile pro-
ceedings was being voiced in popular magazines as
well as legal publications. "' Most significantly, how-
ever, doubts about the juvenile system were being
generated from the appellate bench.
Writing fourteen years before the first pronounce-
ment of the United States Supreme Court in the area
of juvenile justice, Judge White of the California
District Court of Appeals pointed to an undeniable
similarity between juvenile and criminal proceed-
ings, and identified the resulting constitutional
anomaly. For all practical purposes, an adjudica-
tion of delinquency was the equivalent of a criminal
conviction because it amounted to a "blight upon the
character.., and a serious impediment to the future
of. . . [a] minor." 6 The end result of a delinquency
proceeding and a criminal conviction was the same:
deprivation of liberty. Although noting that the
juvenile court was designedto have only salutary
effects, Judge White warned that the juvenile court
should never "be made an instrument for the denial
to a minor of a constitutional right or of a guarantee
afforded by law to an adult."
37
In a ringing dissent from the opinion of the
majority of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in In re
Holmes,38 Justice Musmanno observed that the
ideals and rhetoric of the juvenile courts simply did
"not square with the realities of life." 3 'He dismissed
as a "most disturbing fallacy.., the notion that a
Juvenile Court record does its owner no harm.""'
Adjudication as a juvenile delinquent had in reality
come to constitute a social stigma which would
State v. Monahan, 15 N.J. 34, 59, 104 A.2d 21, 36 (1954)
(dissenting opinion).3
3TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 15, at 29.
3 See, Ellrod and Melany, Juvenile Justice: Treatment
or Travesty? 11 U. PITT. L. REV. 277 (1950); Rubin,
Protecting the Child in the Juvenile Court, 43 J. CRNI,.
L.C. & P.S. 425 (1952); Note, Due Process in the Juvenile
Courts, 2 CATH. U. L. REV. 90 (1952); and especially
the milestone article by Professor Monrad G. Paulsen,
Paulsen, Fairness to the Juvenile Offender, 42 MINN. L.
REV. 547 (1957). Two significant articles in the popular
media were We Need Not Deny Justice to our Children,
Civil Liberties Record of the Greater Philadelphia Branch
ACLU, Feb. 1956, and What Nobody Knows About
Juvenile Delinquency, HARPERS 1958.3
1In re Contreras, 109 Cal. App. 2d 787, 241 P.2d 631
(1952).
161d. at 789, 241 P.2d at 633.
"Id. at 790, 241 P.2d at 633.
38379 Pa. 599, 109 A.2d 523 (1954).
"5 Id. at 612, 109 A.2d 528.
40 Id at 612, 109 A.2d 529.
19761
forever "be there to haunt, plague and torment." 41
Justice Musmanno similarly regarded as fallacious
the reasoning of those who believed the juvenile
process to be "simply an administrative procedure
because its purpose eventually is to provide educa-
tion, care and supervision."" 2 Ultimately:
[F]airness and justice certainly recognize that a
child has the right not to be a ward of the State, not to
be committed to a reformatory, not to be deprived of
his liberty, if he is innocent. The procedure for
ascertaining the guilt or innocence of a minor may be
designated a hearing or a civil inquiry . . . but in
substance and form it is a trial . . . .
In 1956 the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia began to display a serious concern for the
procedural rights ofjuveniles. Over the next six years
there followed a series of decisions which signifi-
cantly expanded the procedural protections to be
accorded juveniles in delinquency proceedings before
the District of Columbia juvenile courts. The most
significant of these cases was to be Kent o. United
States,"4 the United States Supreme Court's first
juvenile justice decision.
In Shioutakon v. District of Columbia 5 the court
held effective assistance of counsel to be essential in
delinquency proceedings in the District of Columbia.
The court's analysis was based on the recognition
that personal liberty was at stake in a delinquency
proceeding, and therefore the assistance of counsel in
juvenile court was just as necessary as in criminal
proceedings."6 Green v. United States4 7 held that
once a juvenile had been transferred to criminal
court, his substantial rights were adversely affected
when the criminal court judge allowed the juvenile
court's transfer order to be admitted into evidence
against him.
Two of the court of appeal's decisions dealt di-
rectly with the transfer process itself. During this
period the District of Columbia Code allowed for
41Id.
'2 1d. at 613, 109 A.2d 529.
4
3 Id. at 613-14, 109 A.2d 529. See also In re Poff, 135
F. Supp. 224 (D.D.C. 1955).
44383 U.S. 541 (1966).
4236 F.2d 666 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
46Shzoutakon was followed by Pee v. United States, 274
F.2d 556 (D.C. Cir. 1959) and Harling v. United States,
295 F.2d 161 (D.C. Cir. 1961), both of which dealt with the
proper treatment of juvenile court admissions in subsequent
criminal proceedings.
'1308 F.2d 303 (D.C. Cir. 1962). Even a cautionary
instruction was held not to limit the danger "that the jury
would draw the inference that a judicial officer has already
concluded that the accused is guilty... " Id. at 304.
waiver of juvenile jurisdiction only following a "full
investigation" by the juvenile court. 48 The Court of
Appeals began its process of interpreting this statu-
tory directive in 1964, when it held in Watkins v.
United States4" that in trans(er proceedings a juve-
nile's attorney was entitled to have access to the
social record concerning his client which had been
compiled by officers of the juvenile court. One year
later in Black v. United States, 5' the court declared
the waiver of juvenile court jurisdiction to be a
"critically important" 5 stage in proceedings against
a juvenile charged with committing a crime, and
therefore found that assistance of counsel was essen-
tial in transfer hearings.
By 1965 the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit had extended a number of proce-
dural safeguards to the District's juvenile court
system. Of particular importance was the fact that
the court focused upon the transfer process as well as
the procedures for adjudicating delinquency. It is to
be noted, however, that these transfer decisions were
based upon interpretation of the District of
Columbia's juvenile court statute, and not upon the
United States Constitution. Yet in the context of
juvenile transfer there remained a number of
unresolved procedural issues, and it was against this
background that Kent v. United States was to
emerge.
III.
Morris A. Kent, Jr. was sixteen years old when he
was arrested in 1961 for housebreaking, robbery and
rape. He was already familiar with the District of
Columbia juvenile court, having been on probation
since he was fourteen. After his apprehension by
police, his mother retained counsel to represent
him.5 2 Early in the proceedings, counsel made
known an intention to oppose Kent's transfer to
"If a child sixteen years of age or older is charged
with an offense which would amount to a felony in the
case of an adult, or any child charged with an offense
which if committed by an adult is punishable by death
or life imprisonment, the judge may, after full inves-
tigation, waive jurisdiction and order such child held
for trial under the regular procedure of the court
which would have jurisdiction of such offense if
committed by an adult . ...
D.C. CODE § 11-914 (1961).
'"343 F.2d 278 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
50355 F.2d 104 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
"Id. at 105.
5 Kent's transfer took place four years prior to the Court
of Appeals' decision in Black, supra note 50, where
juveniles were held to have the right to have court-ap-
pointed counsel in transfer proceedings.
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stand trial as an adult-he believed his client was
amenable to rehabilitation under the treatment facili-
ties of the juvenile court. Without holding a hearing,
however, the juvenile court judge entered an order
reciting that, pursuant to "full investigation," he was
waiving juvenile court jurisdiction and transferring
Kent to the jurisdiction of the District Court. " The
judge had not conferred with Kent, his mother or
defense counsel. No reasons for the transfer decision
were given. Subsequently Kent was indicted by a
grand jury and brought to trial on charges of
housebreaking, robbery and rape. Although a jury
found him not guilty of rape by reason of insanity,
the sixteen-year-old was found guilty of housebreak-
ing and robbery and was sentenced to 30 to 90 years
confinement. At least part of his sentence was to be
spent in mandatory commitment to a mental hos-
pital.
The conviction was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. 54 On
appeal, and later before the United States Supreme
Court, Kent argued that his transfer to adult court
resulted from an invalid waiver of juvenile court
jurisdiction. The Supreme Court upheld Kent's
contention that the waiver order had been improp-
erly made. Since the transfer was reviewable in the
District Court upon a motion to dismiss the indict-
ment, the Court defined the task before it as
determining the standards to be applied in such a
review.
Writing for the majority, 55 Justice Fortas con-
cluded that Kent was "entitled to certain procedures
and benefits as a consequence of his statutory right to
the 'exclusive' jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court." 
5 6
In Kent's case the consequences of transfer were
enormous: if juvenile jurisdiction were retained he
faced a maximum five years' confinement; upon
5 See note 51, supra.
5 Kent v. United States, 343 F.2d 247 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
55 Four justices joined Mr. Justice Fortas in the majority.
Mr. Justice Stewart filed a dissenting opinion in which
Justices Black, Harlan and White joined. The dissent
would have vacated the judgment and remanded the case to
the Court of Appeals for reconsideration in light of that
court's own subsequent decisions in Watkins and Black,
discussed in text accompanying notes 49 and 50 supra,
respectively. The dissent cited to the Court's customary
practice of leaving undisturbed those decisions of the
District of Columbia Circuit which concerned "the import
of legislation governing the affairs of the District." 383 U.S.
at 568. Remand was felt to be advisable because Watkins
and Black "may have considerably modified the court's
construction of the [District of Columbia juvenile court]
statute." Id.
56383 U.S. at 557.
transfer to the district court he was confronted with
a possible sentence of death.
The Court observed that although the juvenile
court should have considerable latitude in making
transfer decisions, such latitude could not be total or
complete, but should provide:
procedural regularity sufficient in the particular cir-
cumstances to satisfy the basic requirements of due
process and fairness, as well as compliance with the
statutory requirement of a "full investigation." 5
Citing to the District of Columbia Circuit's prior
decisions in Black " and Watkins, " the Court
declared that:
[It is clear beyond dispute that the waiver of
jurisdiction is a "critically important" action deter-
mining vitally important statutory rights of the juve-
nile. "o
The majority held that the statutorily prescribed
"full investigation" into the advisability of waiving
juvenile court jurisdiction encompassed three proce-
dural rights. First, the statutory standard required
that a juvenile be given a hearing prior to the entry of
a transfer order. Second, the statute allowed for
counsel to have access to the probation and social
reports which the judge would presumably consult in
making a transfer decision. 6 Finally, to assure
"meaningful appellate review" 2 of transfer orders,
the Court held that the term "full investigation"
required the juvenile court judge to accompany a
transfer order with a statement of reasons explaining
"7Id. at 553.
58See note 50, supra.
5 9See note 49, supra.
60383 U.S. at 556.
6 The court of appeals had held that counsel had no
right to have access to these records, noting that counsel's
role in a transfer hearing was simply that of presenting
to the court anything on behalf of the child which
might help the court in arriving at a decision; it is not
to denigrate the staff's submissions and recommenda-
tions.
343 F.2d at 258.
Such reports had long been regarded as confidential
communications running between the staff and the judge.
The piercing of this veil of confidentiality was regarded by
Professor Paulsen as one of the most significant aspects of
the Kent decision. See Paulsen, supra note 22, at 179-81.
62Meaningful [appellate] review requires that the
reviewing court should review. It should not be
remitted to assumptions.... It may not "assume"
that there are adequate reasons, nor may it merely
assume that "full investigation" has been made.
383 U.S. at 561.
his decision. The Court summarized its conclusions
by declaring that:
[T]here is no place in our system of law for reaching
a result of such tremendous consequences without
ceremony-without hearing, without effective assist-
ance of counsel, without a statement of reasons. It is
inconceivable that a court of justice dealing with
adults, with respect to a similar issue, would proceed
in this manner. It would be extraordinary if society's
special concern for children, as reflected in the District
of Columbia's Juvenile Court Act, permitted this
procedure. We hold that it does not. 63
Portions of the Supreme Court's opinion resound
with the tones of due process, particularly the
pronouncement that the holding was required by a
reading of the relevant statutory provision "in the
context of constitutional principles relating to due
process and the assistance of counsel." 6 4 Constitu-
tional overtones are undeniably present in Kent, yet
the holding cannot be regarded as being of constitu-
tional dimension. Kent must be taken for what the
majority clearly intended it to be: a case of statutory
interpretation. 65 The Court was explicit in delineat-
ing the scope and source of its holding:
The Juvenile Court Act and the decisions of the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia provide an adequate basis for decision of this
case, and wego no further. 6 (Emphasis added.)
It is apparent that the Court in Kent was
concerned with the way in which the implementa-
tion of procedural requirements would affect those
benefits which could still be realized from the juve-
nile system's less formal, child-centered method of
approach. One argument against extending proce-
dural protections to the juvenile court was that the
introduction of formalized procedure would elimi-
65383 U.S. at 554.
64Id. at 557.
65In the years immediately following the Court's deci-
sion in In re Gault, supra note 25, it was enthusiastically
suggested that Gault had raised Kent to the level of a con-
stitutional requirement. In answer to the question of
whether the requirements of Kent were now of constitu-
tional dimension, Professor Schornhorst wrote:
To now distinguish Kent because if dealt only with a
narrow issue of statutory interpretation, and then to
distinguish Gault on the right to counsel issue because
waiver of juvenile court jurisdiction does not result in
"confinement" but in transfer to another court,
reaches a new apogee of judicial sophistry.
Schornhorst, The Waiver of Juvenile Court Jurisdiction:
Kent Revisited. 43 IND. L. J. 583, 588 [hereinafter cited as
Schornhorst].
66383 U.S. at 556.
nate the ability of the juvenile court to function in a
flexible and individually-oriented manner. It was
also contended that the system's resources would be
overborne should procedural regularity be required.
The Court concluded that the transfer hearing did
not have to conform to all the procedural standards of
a criminal trial, but instead "may be informal."
6 7
Similarly, the statement of reasons which was to
accompany each transfer order need not be "formal"
nor need it "necessarily include conventional findings
of fact."16 8 The statement simply must indicate that
the court had carefully considered the transfer ques-
tion and it must set forth the reasons behind the order
to permit meaningful appellate review. 69 Kent was
an attempt to balance the need for procedural
safeguards for juveniles, on the one hand, against
the remaining benefits and available resources of the
juvenile system, on the other. "
In an appendix to the opinion of the Court, the
majority included a policy memorandum which had
been promulgated (but subsequently rescinded) by
the juvenile court of the District of Columbia. "i The




"5The Court specified that the statement must be:
sufficient to demonstrate that the staturory require-
ment of "full investigation" has been met; and that
the question has received the careful consideration of
the Juvenile Court; it must set forth the basis for the
order with sufficient specificity to permit meaningful
review.
383 U.S. at 561.
"5This may be seen as presaging the analytical frame-
work which the Court was to refine in its later juvenile
justice decisions when it sought to determine whether a
particular procedural right was to be extended to the
juvenile court system. See text accompanying notes 90-96
supra.
7'The determinative factors which will be considered by
thejudge in deciding whether the Juvenile Court's jurisdic-
tion over such offenses will be waived are the following:
1. The seriousness of the alleged offense to the
community and whether the protection of the commu-
nity requires waiver.
2. Whether the alleged offense was committed in
an aggressive, violent, premeditated or willful man-
ner.
3. Whether the alleged offense was against persons
or against property, greater weight being given to
offenses against persons especially if personal injury
resulted.
4. The prosecutive merit of the complaint, i.e.,
whether there is evidence upon which a Grand Jury
may be expected to returfi an indictment (to be
determined by consultation with the United States
Attorney).
5. The desirability of trial and disposition of the
entire offense in one court when the juvenile's associ-
ates in the alleged offense are adults who will be
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govern the decision to waive juvenile court jurisdic-
tion. The District of Columbia juvenile court staff
was to "develop fully all available information which
may bear upon [these] criteria and factors .... ), 72
The judge was instructed to "consider the relevant
factors in a specific case before reaching a conclusion
to waive juvenile jurisdiction and transfer ...for
trial . ..under adult procedures .... ","
By including these standards in an appendix, the
Court indicated that the criteria for transfer decision-
making were not to be considered a part of the
holding itself. The criteria, however, were to take on
significant importance when challenges to transfer
proceedings began to be raised in state courts. 74
Kent marked the first time the United States
Supreme Court had directly scrutinized the internal
proceedings of the juvenile court system. The lan-
guage of the majority contained overtones of doubt
and skepticism regarding the quality of justice which
was being dispensed in the juvenile system, declaring
that the theory of the juvenile court was "rooted in
social welfare philosophy rather than in the corpus
juris," and warning that "the admonition to function
in a parental relationship [was] not an invitation to
procedural arbitrariness."'7' The Court referred to
recent studies and articles which questioned whether
the performance of the juvenile system measured well
enough against its "theoretical purpose" to allow
immunity from constitutional guarantees to con-
tinue. 76 It concluded that:
charged with a crime in the U.S. District-Court for the
District of Columbia.
6. The sophistication and maturity of the juvenile
as determined by consideration of his home, environ-
mental situation, emotional attitude and pattern of
living.
7. The record and previous history of the juvenile,
including previous contacts with the Youth Aid
Division, other law enforcement agencies, juvenile
courts and other jurisdictions, prior periods of proba-
tion to this Court, or prior commitments to juvenile
institutions.
8. The prospects for adequate protection of the
public and the likelihood of reasonable rehabilitation
of the juvenile (if he is found to have committed the
alleged offense) by the use of procedures, services and
facilities currently available to the Juvenile Court.
383 U.S. at 566-67.
72 1d. at 567.
711d. at 567-68.
"'For the reaction in Illinois, see text accompanying
notes 100-134 infra.
"'383 U.S. at 554-55.
16383 U.S. at 555. The Court in Kent, as well as in In re
Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), made particular reference to
Note, Juvenile Delinquents: The Police, State Courts, and
Individualized Justice, 79 HARV. L. REV. 775 (1966).
There is evidence, in fact, that there may be grounds
for concern that the child receives the worst of both
worlds: that he gets neither the protections accorded to
adults nor the solicitous care and regenerative treat-
ment postulated for children. "
Kent's counsel had presented a number of argu-
ments based on due process grounds in urging the
Court to reverse their client's conviction . 78 The
Court chose not to reach these constitutional issues,
deciding the case instead on procedural error. How-
ever, the Court noted that the due process issues
raised basic questions which struck at the heart of the
premises upon which the juvenile system had origi-
nally been founded and by which it still continued to
justify its existence. The dicta of Kent laid the
groundwork for the constitutional indictment of
juvenile delinquency proceedings which was to fol-
low in the Court's later juvenile justice decisions."'
The Court's doubts appeared to be strongest where
there was no indication that the benefits of juvenile
court treatment were in any way realistically com-
pensating for the deprivation of procedural rights. "
In In re Gault81 the Court was directly confronted
with the constitutional due process issues which it
17383 U.S. at 556.
78 To support the reversal of his conviction, Kent argued
that 1) he had been unlawfully detained and interrogated by
police, 2) he had been deprived of liberty for about a week
without a determination of probable cause (which would
have been required to detain an adult), 3) he was interro-
gated in the absence of counsel or his parents, 4) he had
been given no warning of his right to remain silent or his
right to counsel, 5) he was fingerprinted in violation of the
intent of the Juvenile Court Act while unlawfully detained.
383 U.S. at 551.79
1In a major article on the Kent decision written in
1966, Professor Paulsen declared that:
The court's opinion . . . does not actually hurl
constitutional thunderbolts at the nation's juvenile
courts and police practices respecting juveniles, [but]
it does raise a warning of turbulent weather ahead.
Paulsen, supra note 22, at 183.
8 While there can be no doubt of the original laudable
purpose of the juvenile courts, studies and critiques in
recent years raise serious questions as to whether
actual performance measures well enough against
theoretical purpose to make tolerable the immunity of
the process from the reach of constitutional guarantees
applicable to adults. There is much evidence that some
juvenile courts . . . lack the personnel, facilities and
techniques to perform adequately as representatives of
the State in a parens patriae capacity, at least with
respect to children charged with law violation. There
is evidence, in fact, that there may be grounds for
concern that the child receives the worst of both
worlds: that he gets neither the protections accorded
to adults nor the solicitous care and regenerative
treatment postulated for children.
383 U.S. at 55-56.
81387 U.S. 1 (1967).
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had chosen not to decide the year before in Kent. The
question before the Court in Gault was that of
determining "the precise impact of the due process
requirement" on delinquency proceedings injuvenile
courts. 52 Citing to the forewarning he had given in
his Kent opinion, Mr. Justice Fortas for the major-
ity " emphatically declared that "neither the Four-
teenth Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for adults
alone." 8' After reviewing the origins of the juvenile
court movement, the Court laid to rest a number of
the arguments which had been advanced to justify the
absence of procedural safeguards in the juvenile
system. Although it did not deny the lofty notions
and good intentions of the early social reformers, the
Court declared that their efforts had led to a
"peculiar system for juveniles, unknown to our law
in any comparable context," having a theoretical
basis which was debatable "to say the least." 5 The
doctrine of parens patriae was in reality nothing
more than a rationalization developed by the pio-
neers of the movement to explain away the absence
of constitutionally-required procedures in their new
system. 86
The Court also found it to be increasingly appar-
ent that the results produced under the juvenile
system were not satisfactory. The Court cited the
high rate of recidivism within the juvenile system and
the alarming statistics on juvenile crime, and con-
cluded that the absence of constitutional protections
neither reduced crime nor led to effective rehabilita-
tion of offenders.
Because the end result of juvenile proceedings was
likely to be either incarceration or some other form
of deprivation of liberty, the Court went on to declare
that, given those consequences,
[lit would be quite extraordinary if our Constitu-
tion did not require the procedural regularity and the
exercise of care implied in the phrase "due process." 87
821Id. at 14.
83 Gault, like Kent, was a 5-4 decision. Joining Mr.
Justice Fortas in the majority were Chief Justice Warren,
and Justices Douglas, Clark and Brennan. Separate concur-
ring opinions were written by Justice Black and Justice
White. Justice Harlan filed an opinion in which he
concurred in part and dissented in part. Justice Stewart
wrote a dissenting opinion.
81387 U.S. at 13.
151d. at 17.
8
6The Latin phrase proved to be a great help to those
who sought to rationalize the exclusion of juveniles
from the constitutional scheme; but its meaning is
murky and its historic credentials are of dubious
relevance.... [Tihere is no trace of the doctrine in
the history of criminal jurisprudence.
Id. at 16.
8 7 Id. at 27-28.
Four specific procedural safeguards were held to
be constitutionally required in delinquency proceed-
ings: the right to notice of charges, the right to
assistance of counsel, the right to confrontation of
witnesses, and the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion.
Yet in spite of the broad sweep of the majority's
language, the actual holding of Gault was rather
narrow. The Court specifically declared that its
holding was to apply only to delinquency adjudica-
tion proceedings and not to dispositional hearings. 88
The Court made a point of asserting that valuable
aspects were still to be found within the jurisdiction
of the juvenile court 9 and was careful to note that
the four procedural rights being extended to juveniles
in Gault would not impair "the features of the
juvenile system which its proponents have asserted
are of unique benefit." "
Gault clearly does not stand for the proposition
that a child in delinquency proceedings must be
accorded the full panoply of procedural safeguards
guaranteed by the Constitution to adults in criminal
proceedings. " It cannot be doubted, however, that
Gault was to mark the beginning of a new era in the
history of the juvenile court system: zealous social
workers and juvenile court judges would no longer
be permitted to ignore the Constitution of the United
States.
The Supreme Court has decided three additional
" Id. at 27. See note 10 supra.
8 Among such "valuable aspects" the Court enumerated
the following: 1) the fact that juveniles are processed and
treated under a system separate from adults; 2) the effort
made by the juvenile system to avoid classifying a juvenile
as a criminal; 3) the fact that an adjudication of delin-
quency does not result in any civil disability or in disqualifi-
cation from civil service appointment; 4) the emphasis
placed in the juvenile system on the good will, com-
passion, and kindliness of the juvenile court judge.
However, the Court seriously disputed the credibility of the
juvenile system's claims to confidentiality and secrecy,
noting that the claim of secrecy was more often rhetoric
than reality because the records of the juvenile court in most
jurisdictions could be disclosed at the judge's discretion. Id.
at 23-27.
"8Id. at 22.
"The Gault case did not present the questions of
whether the right to bail, the right to jury trial, or the right
to a standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt-all of
which were available to adults-should be accorded to
juveniles as well. Because Gault was before it on a petition
for habeas corpus, the Court held it did not need to reach
the question of whether the C6nstitution required there be a
right to obtain appellate review of delinquency adjudica-
tions. Similarly, because it was not deciding the question of
the right to appellate review, the Court held it did not need
to decide whether the failure to provide a transcript of a
delinquency hearing was a denial of due process. Id. at 58.
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juvenile justice cases since Gault: In In re Winship "
the Court extended another procedural right to the
juvenile defendant by holding that in delinquency
proceedings juvenile offenders were constitutionally
entitled to the standard of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt. In McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, " however, the
Court declined to hold that jury trials were constitu-
tionally required in juvenile delinquency proceed-
ings. The 4-3 decision was based upon the plural-
ity's conclusion that a jury trial was not a "neces-
sary component of accurate factfinding." " The
opinion sought to support this conclusion by analo-
gizing to several types of cases where jury trial was
not required: military trials, cases in equity, pro-
bate, deportation and workmen's compensation
cases. "Breed v. Jones, "however, extended the ju-
venile's rights and held that a juvenile is unconsti-
tutionally subjected to double jeopardy if he is trans-
ferred to stand trial as an adult in criminal court fol-
lowing an adjudication at the juvenile level.
The Supreme Court has continued to apply and
refine its balancing approach in these later decisions.
The fact that a given right has been previously held
to be constitutionally required in proceedings against
adults is no talisman which automatically assures the
extension of that right to the juvenile system.
Particularly in McKeiver and Breed the Court
manifested concern that the already severely taxed
resources of the juvenile system should not be
92397 U.S. 358 (1970).
93403 U.S. 528 (1971).
1"Id. at 543.
"The logic of this conclusion evaporates when it is noted
that military trials do not arise under the Constitution, and
the remaining cases are not examples of criminal proceed-
ings involving the possible deprivation of personal liberty.
The plurality, however, also expressed particular concern
that requiring jury trials would "provide an attrition of the
juvenile court's assumed ability to function in a unique
manner." Id. at 547. This part of the opinion can well be
regarded as constituting an implicit recognition that the
enormous increases in cost and delay which accompany the
right to jury trial might well have overstressed the limited
resources of the juvenile system.
"421 U.S. 519 (1975). The Court's analysis in Breed
focused on the by now familiar conclusion that the conse-
quences of juvenile adjudication approach in seriousness
those of a criminal prosecution. The end result of each
proceeding is the same: incarceration for the purpose of
enforcing the criminal law. The risk of such incarceration
was precisely the sort of risk which the term "jeopardy"
had been held to define. Furthermore, application of the
constitutional guarantee against being twice put injeopardy
for the same offense would not unduly tax the capabilities of
the juvenile court system. Through the simple device of
requiring that transfer proceedings be conducted prior to an
adjudicatory hearing, the juvenile system could effectively
assure the protection against double jeopardy.
overwhelmed by the introduction of formalized pro-
cedures.
Gault, Winship and Breed have brought about a
substantial "constitutional domestication" '7 ofjuve-
nile court delinquency procedures. Supreme Court
involvement in delinquency proceedings has largely
eliminated the possibility of the sort of procedural
arbitrariness which had come to characterize the
juvenile system in the pre-Gault era. As a result of
these decisions, minors in delinquency proceedings
in both federal and state juvenile courts now enjoy
most of the procedural rights which are available to
adults. "
Unlike its holdings regarding delinquency pro-
ceedings, the Supreme Court's only decision on
juvenile transfer was not based upon the Constitu-
tion. Kent v. United States rested upon the interpre-
tation of a statute-the Juvenile Court Act of the
"The phrase was coined by Mr. Justice Fortas in Gault,
when the majority declared that "the features of the juvenile
system which its proponents have asserted are of unique
benefit will not be impaired by constitutional domestica-
tion." 387 U.S. at 22.
"Juveniles, of course, do not enjoy the right to trial by
jury in delinquency proceedings under the holding of
McKeiver v. Pennsylvania. See text accompanying notes
93-95, supra.
It is unlikely if the sixth amendment right to a public
trial will ever be found to be constitutionally required in the
juvenile system. Although it may be argued that public
trials would expose questionable procedures to community
scrutiny, private hearings and confidential records serve a
significant protective purpose in juvenile court proceedings.
By denying the public access to juvenile deliberations, it is
hoped that the individual juvenile will be spared from the
sort of publicity that could limit the effectiveness of his
rehabilitation and perhaps jeopardize his entire future as
well.
It is uncertain whether the fourth amendment exclusion-
ary rule will ever be extended to the juvenile court system.
Application of the rule would greatly complicate juvenile
proceedings in that large amounts of time and money would
be consumed in arguing motions to suppress evidence
alleged to have been illegally seized. It is also apparent that
the present Supreme Court is gradually cutting back on the
sweep of the rule announced in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S.
643 (1961). See Stone v. Powell, 96. S. Ct. 3037 (1976).
Thus it is unlikely that the Court, as a practical matter,
would require the juvenile courts to apply the exclusionary
rule.
One of the most interesting issues in the field of juvenile
rights litigation today concerns the right to treatment,
particularly in reference to minors in need of supervision
(MINS). See Nelson v. Heyne, 491 F.2d 352 (7th Cir.
1974); Morales v. Turman, 383 F. Supp. 53 (E.D. Tex.
1974); Martarella v. Kelley, 349 F. Supp. 575 (S.D.N.Y.
1972). See also O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563,
(1975); Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781 (N.D. Ala.
1971); Wald and Schwartz, Trying a Juvenile Right to
Treatment Suit: Pointers and Pitfalls for Plaintiffs, 12 Am.
CRiM. L. REv. 125 (1974).
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District of Columbia. Thus, unlike the later deci-
sions, Kent does not carry the force of constitutional
compulsion and each state has remained free to
determine the extent of procedural protection to be
accorded juveniles in transfer decision making."
IV.
Juvenile transfer in Illinois illustrates a number of
due process problems which have continued to exist
because the holding in Kent was not cast in constitu-
tional terms. At the time of Kent and for a number of
years thereafter, the Illinois Juvenile Court Act 'o
created a method of transfer which was virtually
unique to Illinois. ' Under the structure of the Illi-
nois court system, the juvenile division and the crim-
inal division are considered co-equal branches within
the county circuit court. ' The Illinois Juvenile
Court Act permitted the prosecutor to choose the
"5 For an excellent summary of the various state juvenile
codes, see M. LEVIN & R. SARRI, JUVENILE DELINQUENCY:
A STUDY OF JUVENILE CODES IN THE U.S. (1974) [herein-
after cited as LEVIN & SARRII.
1"'If a petition alleges commission by a minor 13
years of age or over of an act which constitutes a crime
under the laws of this State, the State's Attorney shall
determine the court in which that minor is to be
prosecuted; however if the Juvenile Court Judge
objects to the removal of a case from thejurisdiction of
the Juvenile Court, the matter shall be referred to the
chief judge of the circuit for decision and disposition.
If criminal proceedings are instituted, the petition
shall be dismissed insofar as the act or acts involved in
the criminal proceedings are concerned. Taking of
evidence in an adjudicatory hearing in any such case is
a bar to criminal proceedings based upon the conduct
alleged in the petition.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37 § 702-7(3) (1967). Section 702-
7(3) was amended in 1973 by P.A. 77-2096 and P.A. 78-
341.
"'"The distinctiveness of the Illinois procedure did not
escape the attention of a number of commentators. See
Schornhorst, supra note 65; Professor Paulsen also ob-
served that the Illinois Juvenile Court Act presented "an
interesting problem.... Must the prosecutor now hold a
hearing if Kent has announced constitutional principles?"
Paulsen supra note 22, at 182 n.61. Levin and Sarri noted
Illinois was only one of four states where "the prosecutor
plays a major role in transfer proceedings: only he is
empowered to request waiver." LEVIN & SARRI, supra note
99, at 22-23. Illinois was also noted as being one of only six
states where transfer was either not allowed, or where the
decision was not made by the juvenile court judge. Two of
those six states, New York and Vermont, had very low ages
for original jurisdiction of the criminal court (15 and 16
respectively). Id. at 21.
'" Prior to 1964, the juvenile court of Cook County was
a court of separate jurisdiction. In 1964, the formerjuvenile
court and the former criminal court became divisions of a
single unified court. ILL. REV. STAT. ch 37 § 701-8 (1975).
forum in which to institute proceedings against a
juvenile alleged to have committed a criminal act.
The judiciary was accorded a decidedly secondary
role.
Once the prosecutor had determined that criminal
charges were to be pressed, a motion to that effect
was brought before the juvenile court judge. The
judge was given the opportunity only to "object" to
the prosecutor's choice of forum. If he raised no
objection, juvenile jurisdiction ended automatically,
and the case was removed to the criminal division for
prosecution. The making of such an objection,
however, did not automatically guarantee that juve-
nile jurisdiction would be retained. An objection
brought about a referral of the transfer question for
decision by the chief judge of the county circuit
court. The chief judge in turn designated a special
juvenile court judge to conduct an investigation and
hearing into the propriety of the prosecutor's deci-
sion. Should this judge find it to be in the best in-
terests of neither the child nor the public at large to
proceed with the case in juvenile court, a transfer
order would issue.
In reality, however, this complex series of referrals
from judge to judge would only rarely be called into
play. Because the decision to institute criminal court
proceedings was totally a matter of prosecutorial
discretion, "' a hearing under the Illinois statute was
required only where the juvenile court judge objected
to the prosecutor's determination. A study of all 1971
cases in Cook County in which a juvenile was
charged with murder or involuntary manslaughter
revealed that the judge objected to transfer in only
7.2% of the cases. 1
0 4
103 In a discussion of transfer as a matter for prosecuto-
rial discretion, Professor Schornhorst, with particular refer-
ence to Illinois, observed:
These approaches to waiver are of doubtful validity
in light of the controls which the Supreme Court,
through Kent, has placed upon a juvenile judge's
exercise of a similar discretionary power. It would
indeed be strange if this critically important decision
can now be left wholly to the prosecutor who cannot
be expected to weigh objectively the welfare of the
child against the need to protect society from the child.
The possibilities for arbitrary and discriminatory
choice allowed by this method of waiver render it
contrary to principles of equal protection as well as
due process of law . . . . On the whole, the prosecu-
tor's choice [of] method of waiver ... is unsatisfac-
tory and probably unconstitutional.
Schornhorst, supra note 65, 598-99.
It must be recalled, however, that the author viewed
Kent, when read in light of Gault, as approaching the level
of a constitutional requirement. See note 65, supra.
'*'CHICAGO LAW ENFORCEMENT STUDY GROUP, Dis-
CRETION IN JUVENILE JUSTICE: A STUDY OF TRIAL OF
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The consequences of transfer were largely the
same no matter where a juvenile lived, that is, the
juvenile facing transfer in Illinois stood to forfeit the
same sorts of statutory rights and benefits which
Morris A. Kent, Jr., had lost when he was trans-
ferred to stand trial in the criminal court of the
District of Columbia. 105 "[The determination of
whether to transfer a child from the statutory
structure of the Juvenile Court to the criminal
processes of the [adult court]" was just as "critically
important" 10 6 for the child in Illinois as for the child
in the District of Columbia. In the overwhelming
majority of cases in Illinois, however, a youth would
be compelled to relinquish his statutory rights to
juvenile treatment solely as a result of a prosecutor's
decision.
This method for the transfer of juveniles to adult
court was clearly at variance with the method which
had been approved by the United States Supreme
Court for application in the District of Columbia in
the Kent case. Although Kent did not carry the force
of constitutional compulsion and thus could not itself
bring about a change in the transfer practices of the
various states, even such a limited pronouncement by
the Supreme Court was enough to inspire court
challenges to the Illinois transfer statute.
In 1967, shortly after Kent and Gault, the Illinois
Supreme Court in In re Urbasek1 1 7 held that due
process required that the standard of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt be applied in juvenile court delin-
quency proceedings. The Urbasek opinion contained
language which strongly suggested that Gault had
implicity raised the Kent holding to the level of a
constitutional requirement. Although Kent was lim-
JUVENILES As ADULTS IN COOK COUNTY (1975) [hereinafter
cited as STUDY GROUP REPORT]. For this study, the
Chicago Law Enforcement Study Group in 1972 obtained
permission to analyze the records of the Juvenile Court of
Cook County. Their report gave several reasons why their
study had been limited to cases involving murder. First,
such a classification had in part been dictated by the
materials which had been made available to their research-
ers. Second, the cases involving murder fit well into the
methodological ideal of obtaining a sample that contained
cases in which transfer had been ordered as well as cases in
which juvenile jurisdiction had been retained. Third, it had
been established in an earlier study that the great majority
of decisions to transfer were made in cases involving
murder. See MAXIME, MILLER, & STREIT, THE RIGHT TO
REMAIN A JUVENILE (1972). The Study Group concluded
that it was therefore "safe to generalize about the juvenile
transfer process as a whole from looking at the murder
cases." STUDY GROUP REPORT at 8.
105 See text accompanying notes 3-10 supra.
106383 U.S. at 560.
10738 IIl. 2d 535,232 N.E.2d 716 (1967).
ited in its application to the juvenile courts of the
District of Columbia, such a limitation had been
effectively removed by the court's admonition in In
re Gault that neither the fourteenth amendment nor
theBill of Rights is for adults only. 108
This conclusion on the part of the Illinois Su-
preme Court gave rise to an argument that even if
Kent alone could not compel a change in the Illinois
transfer process, Kent and Gault when read together
could accomplish that objective. 109 Kent itself had
also contained language which suggested that due
process issues of constitutional magnitude were pre-
sented in the context of a transfer proceeding. The
Court had explicitly stated that the three procedural
safeguards it was requiring in transfer proceedings
in the District of Columbia were necessitated by
reading the Juvenile Court Act "in the context of
constitutional principles relating to due process and
the assistance of counsel." 'ao [Emphasis added.]
Prosecutorial discretion is not a fair substitute for
judicial discretion; therefore, it could be argued that
the Illinois transfer statute did not afford juveniles
a full measure of procedural due process. Following
the Urbasek decision, a succession of constitutional
challenges against the provision was launched in
the Illinois appellate courts.
In People v. Jilesl Il a direct appeal had been
taken from a transfer order, prior to the commence-
ment of criminal proceedings, on the ground that the
Illinois transfer statute violated due process. Jiles
maintained that the statute was vulnerable on three
counts: first, because it failed to give guidance to the
juvenile court judge or to the parties regarding the
issues to be considered in a transfer determination.
The statute was similarly silent as to the nature of
the burden of proof and by whom it was to be
carried. Second, it was argued that the statute con-
stituted an invalid delegation of legislative power,
since no standards for decision-making were in-
cluded in the statute itself. Finally, Jiles urged that
the transfer statute was both vague and ambiguous
and thus violated both the due process and equal
protection clauses. The Illinois Supreme Court,
however, did not reach these constitutional ques-
tions. The court instead chose to rest its decision on
1 'Id. at 539-40, 232 N.E.2d at 718. It will be noted
that Illinoiswas in the vanguard of states which required a
standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in delinquency
proceedings prior to the Supreme Court's holding in
Winship, see note 92 supra.
109See text accompanying notes 81-87 supra.
110383 U.S. at 557.
1143 Ill.2d 145, 251 N.E.2d 529 (1969).
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the procedural ground that the case had been im-
properly presented for review.
The opinion of the court, written by Justice
Schaefer, held that no direct appeal could be taken
from a transfer order in Illinois. Direct appeal was
found to be unavailable for two reasons. First, a
transfer order could not be a final order, given the
fact that the juvenile division and the criminal
division were co-equal branches within the same
county circuit court. Second, the Illinois legislature
had chosen to provide for transfer largely on the basis
of prosecutorial discretion, and a decision to prose-
cute is not subject to judicial review.
The files court took a very narrow view of Kent:
the Supreme Court's holding was regarded as having
express application only in the District of Columbia,
and not in analogous proceedings under the juvenile
court acts of the fifty states. While acknowledging
that
it may be highly desirable to commit to the judge of
a specialized juvenile court the determination of
whether or not a particular juvenile is to be prosecuted
criminally, we are aware of no constitutional require-
ment that a state must do so. "'
The Illinois legislature had "chosen not to do so,"
and had established its own "unique" transfer
mechanism, with "the role of the judge . . . sharply
diminished." '"In such circumstances, the mandates
of Kent were simply not "particularly relevant." 114
The next challenge to the Illinois transfer proce-
dure was decided by the state supreme court in 1972.
In People v. Bornbacino ' 5 the juvenile court judge
had entered no objection to the prosecutor's decision
to initiate criminal proceedings against a sixteen year
old boy accused of voluntary manslaughter. The boy
was subsequently brought to trial as an adult in
criminal court. Following a jury trial, he was found
guilty and sentenced to a prison term of from one to
five years. On appeal, Bombacino relied on Kent in
attacking the constitutionality of the Illinois Juvenile
Court Act. The principal argument was that he had
been denied due process of law because the statute
did not require the juvenile court judge to conduct a
hearing in all cases where the prosecutor sought to
initiate proceedings against a juvenile in criminal
court.
The Illinois Supreme Court rejected this conten-
tion. The court relied upon files in holding that the
"2 Id. at 148-49, 251 N.E.2d at 531.
"'Id. at 149, 251 N.E.2d at 531.
'Id. at 148, 251 N.E.2d at 530.
11s51 Ill.2d 17, 280 N.E.2d 697 (1972).
Illinois legislature had chosen to vest the prosecutor
with power to select the forum in which to proceed
against a juvenile accused of committing a criminal
offense. The court concluded that the role of the
juvenile court judge in Illinois was so greatly
diminished as not to require a due process hearing
"at this stage of the proceeding." ' 6 Bombacino's
petition for certiorari to the United States Supreme
Court was denied. 117
Shortly after Bombacino, the Illinois Supreme
Court announced its decision in the case of People v.
Handley. "8 On appeal from a convictiofn for murder,
Handley and his co-defendants contended that the
criminal court lacked jurisdiction to try them be-
cause the 1967 transfer statute was unconstitutional.
The constitutional challenge was unmistakably
framed in terms of the procedural requirements
which the United States Supreme Court had en-
dorsed in Kent. It was argued that the Illinois stat-
ute was constitutionally infirm because 1) it did not
specify the standards on which a transfer decision
was to be based, 2) it did not require a hearing, and
3) it did not require a record of the juvenile court
judge's reasons for not objecting to the waiver of
juvenile jurisdiction. It was additionally urged that
vesting the state's attorney with the power to trans-
fer without any statutory standards to guide and
limit his disrection was a deprivation of due proc-
ess and a denial of equal protection.
The court held that all these issues had been
effectively disposed of in Bombacino. Reliance on
Kent was again held to be inappropriate, given the
particular distinctions between the transfer statute in
Illinois and that existing in the District of Columbia.
Furthermore, the court held that it was not
constitutionally necessary for the statute to provide
standards to guide the state's attorney in choosing the
forum in which to proceed against a juvenile. It was
imperative that the state's attorney, in the interests of
the administration of justice, be accorded "a large
measure of discretion""11 in the performance of his
duties. The court observed that the state's attorney
could be presumed to consider the purposes of the
Juvenile Court Act in deciding the forum in which to
initiate proceedings against a youthful offender. 120
"Id. at 20,280 N.E.2d at 699.
117409 U.S. 912 (1972).
-- 51 Ill.2d 229, 282 N.E.2d 131 (1972).
"Id. at 233, 282 N.E.2d at 135.
120(1) The purpose of this Act is to secure for each
minor subject hereto such care and guidance, prefera-
bly in his own home, as will serve the moral,
emotional, mental, and physical welfare of the minor
and the best interests of the community; to preserve
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Thus, the court seemed to imply that the prosecutor's
discretion would not be altogether unguided.
In People vs. Sprinkle"2 the Illinois transfer
statute was alleged to be an unconstitutional depriva-
tion of due process because it did not provide for a
judicial hearing on whether juvenile court jurisdic-
tion ought to be waived. The state supreme court
refuted this challenge by observing that the due
process clause of the fifth amendment had histori-
cally been interpreted as guaranteeing a hearing
only in cases involving judicial or quasi-judicial
decision-making. Under the Illinois statute, how-
ever, transfer was not a matter for judicial or quasi-
judicial decision; it was left to prosecutorial discre-
tion.
[T]he... legislature... [has] reasonably vested in
the State's Attorney, rather than the judge of the ju-
venile court in a judicial proceeding, the responsibility
of deciding whether the offender should be proceeded
against as an adult or as a juvenile. "'
The court went on to note that the guarantee of a
hearing included in the fifth amendment's due
process clause
has never been held applicable to the process of
prosecutorial decision making. If it were so held, the
prosecutorial function would be vitally impaired. 121
The constitutionality of the Illinois transfer statute
was also upheld by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in 1974.124 When
the United States Supreme Court declined to review
his conviction for manslaughter, Joseph Bombacino
petitioned for habeas corpus in the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois.
The lower court ordered him released from custody
because it found the Illinois transfer provision to be
and strengthen the minor's family ties whenever
possible, removing him from the custody of his parents
only when his welfare or safety or the protection of the
public cannot be adequately safeguarded without
removal; and, when the minor is removed from his
own family, to secure for him custody, care and
discipline as nearly as possible equivalent to that
which should be given by his parents, and in cases
where it should and can properly be done to place the
minor in a family home so that he may become a
member of the family by legal adoption or otherwise.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37 § 701-2 (1975).
12156 Ill.2d 257, 307 N.E.2d 161 (1974).
12Id. at 260, 307 N.E.2d at 162.
3Id. at 261, 307 N.E.2d at 163.
2'Bombacino v. Bensinger, 498 F.2d 875 (7th Cir.
1972).
constitutionally unsound. But in an opinion written
by Judge John Paul Stevens, 125 the appellate court
agreed with the prior interpretation of the Illinois
Supreme Court that Kent had rested explicitly on the
language of the District of Columbia Juvenile Court
Act. Acknowledging that other language in Kent,
especially when read in conjunction with Gault, 126
suggested that transfer proceedings must comport
with due process requirements, the court observed
that on balance there was
some uncertainty about the impact of the Due Process
Clause on the procedure followed by a state in
determining whether to transfer a youth from the
jurisdiction of the juvenile court to that of a court of
ordinary jurisdiction. 127
Citing Justice Schaefer's opinion in files, the court
noted, however, that there was also "respectable
authority"' 12 1 to support the proposition that a
legislature could properly provide that transfer deter-
minations be left to the discretion of the prosecutor.
Under this view, procedural safeguards would not be
constitutionally required unless the state elected to
provide for judicial participation in the transfer deci-
sion. 12
Bombacino made two procedural objections to his
transfer to criminal court; first, that he was not
provided an evidentiary hearing, and second, that no
statement of reasons was given by the juvenile court
judge to explain why he supported the prosecutor's
decision to commence criminal proceedings. To the
first contention, the court replied that an evidentiary
showing of probable cause was unnecessary under
the Illinois statute, and that the record showed that
Bombacino had, in fact, been given an opportunity to
present evidence on his own behalf at the transfer
proceeding. "'
"'Now an Associate Justice of the United States
Supreme Court.
"6The court acknowledged that the two cases "indicated
that [transfer] proceedings must comport with the basic
requirements of the Due Process Clause . 498 F.2d at
876-77.
2
7 Id. at 877.
12Id. See also Cox v. United States, 473 F.2d 334 (4th
Cir. 1973), in which the en banc panel of the Fourth Circuit
upheld the constitutionality of allowing the prosecutor's
discretion to control the transfer process.
129498 F.2d at 877.
"'Furthermore, the court noted, nothing in either "the
Kent opinion or in the concept of fundamental fairness...
[mandated] such a hearing before the jurisdiction of the
juvenile court may be waived." 498 F.2d at 878.
1976]
COMMENTS
Regarding the second objection, the court held that
due process did not require a statement of reasons to
accompany a transfer order. In the court's view, the
need for a statement of reasons in any type of
proceeding had to be "evaluated in ... light of the
function [which] such a statement was to per-
form." 1"' Three specific contexts were cited in which
courts had held that a statement of reasons was
necessary to assure due process of law. A statement
explaining a decision was necessary 1) in situations
where a layman was unrepresented by counsel, 2) to
obtain meaningful appellate review, and 3) where a
person needed to know the standards of the decision-
maker to which he must conform his future con-
duct. 132 None of these special circumstances were
presented by the Illinois juvenile transfer process.
The court of appeals admitted that a statement of
reasons was of "significant value... because [it]
reduces the risk that a decision may be, or may ap-
pear to be arbitrary." I " It concluded, however, that
a statement of reasons could not be "constitutionally
mandated simply as a safeguard against real or
apparent arbitrariness." 131
V.
Although the Illinois process of transfer by prose-
cutorial decision survived numerous assaults in both
state and federal courts, the Illinois legislature,
seeking to bring the transfer statute more in line with
the procedure recommended in Kent, 135 enacted a
new transfer provision which became effective in
1973:
1 1id. at 878.
'
32 Id. at 878-79. See King v. United States, 492 F.2d
1337 (7th Cir. 1974) (importance of providing uncounselled
layman with a written explanation of a denial of parole);
United States v. Lemmens, 430 F.2d 619 (7th Cir. 1970)
(importance of providing statement of reasons for denying
Selective Service reclassification); Miller v. Twomey, 479
F.2d 701 (7th Cir. 1973) (importance of statement of
reasons in the context of prison disciplinary proceedings).
133498 F.2d at 878.
' 
4 Id. at 878-79.
"' 5The amended section closely parallels the transfer
provision of the District of Columbia Juvenile Court
Act, D.C. Code sec. 11-11533 et seq., (1969), as
interpreted by the United States Supreme Court in
Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966). The Kent
case held that the "waiver decision was one of critical
importance" to the juvenile involved, and, therefore,
the guarantee of due process requires that he be
afforded certain procedural protections in waiver
proceedings.
COUNCIL COMMENTARY, COUNCIL ON THE DIAGNOSIS AND
EVALUATION OF CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS, Prepared in con-
nection with the Unified Code of Corrections, ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 37 §702-7(3) (1975).
If a petition alleges commission by a minor 13 years
of age or over of an act which constitutes a crime under
the laws of this State, and, on motion of the State's
Attorney, a Juvenile Judge, designated by the Chief
Judge of the Circuit to hear and determine such
motions, after investigation and hearing but before
commencement of the adjudicatory hearing, finds that
it is not in the best interests of the minor or of the
public to proceed under this Act, the court may enter
an order permitting prosecution under the criminal
laws.
In making its determination on a motion to permit
prosecution under the criminal laws, the court shall
consider among other matters: (1) whether there is
sufficient evidence upon which a grand jury may be
expected to return an indictment; (2) whether there is
evidence that the alleged offense was committed in an
aggressive and premeditated manner; (3) the age of the
minor; (4) the previous history of the minor; (5)
whether there are facilities particularly available to the
Juvenile Court for the treatment and rehabilitation of
the minor; and (6) whether the best interest of the
minor and the security of the public may require that
the minor continue in custody or under supervision for
a period extending beyond his minority."'
The 1973 statute has eliminated the possibility of
transfer simply on the basis of the prosecutor's
decision to institute proceedings in criminal court.
The responsibility for transfer decision-making now
rests with the juvenile court judge. The judge must
conduct an investigation and hearing whenever the
state's attorney requests the waiver of juvenile
jurisdiction over a minor accused of having com-
mitted a criminal act. A determination of probable
cause must be made at the transfer hearing, and
specific criteria to guide the judge in his decision are
included in the statute.
In providing for transfer to be a matter for judicial
decision based upon investigation and hearing, the
Illinois legislature has taken a step toward compli-
ance with the procedures recommended by the
Supreme Court in Kent. But conspicuously absent
from the new Illinois transfer statute are two
elements which were integral parts of the Kent
decision: there is no requirement that a statement of
reasons for the transfer accompany the judge's order
permitting criminal prosecution, and the statute
does not provide a mechanism for direct appellate
review of a transfer order prior to the commencement
of proceedings in criminal court.
In the absence of provisions for appellate review
and a statement of reasons, it may be argued that
the current transfer provision has simply substi-
'ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 37 § 702-7(3) (1975).
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tuted the unchecked discretion of the juvenile court
judge for that of the prosecutor. The 1973 statute
does include a series of standards designed to guide
the judge in arriving at a transfer decision, which
may preserve the statute against challenges for
vagueness. The remaining question is whether these
standards, in the absence of a required statement of
reasons, can assure that the judge's decision will
comport with appropriate standards of due process
and fundamental fairness.
The criteria set forth in the present statute appear
largely to have been based upon those appended to
the Supreme Court's opinion in Kent."37 They
represent a variety of factors which need to be
addressed in an attempt to balance the best interests
of the child against the societal interests present in a
transfer determination. The criteria, however, are
neither clearly nor precisely defined."' 8 There is no
indication, for example, of what is to be included in
the "previous history of the minor." 1'9 If the minor's
past juvenile court record is to be taken as the
equivalent of "previous history," a question of
fundamental fairness is immediately presented. A
minor's juvenile court record may well contain a
wide variety of information relating to non-delin-
quent as well as delinquent behavior. In addition to
prior adjudications and dispositions of delinquency
petitions, the record may include information on
prior MINS 140 proceedings against the minor and
pre-judicial involvements as well. Such non-delin-
quent behavior can be seen as having little relevance
to a determination of whether or not a juvenile
should be tried as an adult under the criminal laws.
Including non-delinquent behavior in the minor's
previous history leaves open the possibility that the
transfer decision might be unduly influenced by the
accumulation of his prior "bad acts."
Similarly, no elaboration is given to the terms
"best interests of the minor" and "security of the
public." 4 1 Although generalized notions come to
mind, the terms are so open-textured that, standing
alone, they are susceptible to a wide variety of
interpretations. Without some explanatory statement
by the judge, it is impossible to ascertain the specific
137See note 71 supra.
'"There is an absence of critical literature on the 1973
Illinois juvenile transfer statute. The criticisms which
follow were in large measure developed during the course of
a seminar in juvenile law taught in Spring, 1976, at the
Northwestern University School of Law.
"'ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 37 § 702-7(3) (1975).
140 "Minors in Need of Supervision." See note 2 supra.
"'ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37 § 702-7 (1975).
considerations which support his conclusion that a
transfer order is warranted in any given case.
Additional difficulties are presented by the word-
ing of the fifth criterion: "whether there are facilities
particularly available to the Juvenile Court for the
treatment and rehabilitation of the minor." "" This
portion of the statute may be seeking to address the
question of whether an individual juvenile is ame-
nable to rehabilitation under juvenile jurisdiction.
The entire juvenile system has historically been
posited on the belief that juveniles were particu-
larly susceptible to being rehabilitated through
non-punitive treatment and therapy. This belief
was reflected in the final criterion cited with ap-
proval by the Supreme Court in Kent: whether or
not a juvenile was a likely prospect for "reasonable
rehabilitation" at the juvenile level. "" The Illinois
provision, however, may also be interpreted as
directing the juvenile court judge to ascertain wheth-
er there is room to accommodate the minor within a
particular juvenile court program or institution.
Under the basic treatment philosophy of the juvenile
court, query if transfer can ever be justified simply
because the state has not allocated the resources to
provide rehabilitation facilities. 144
There is no provision in the transfer statute which
gives guidance as to how the individual criteria are to
be weighted. In a typical transfer hearing, it may not
be uncommon for evidence on two or more of the
1421d.
13See note 71 supra.
144 A case dealing with this very question was recently
decided by the Supreme Court of Minnesota. In In re
Welfare of J.E.C., 225 N.W.2d 245 (1975), the juvenile
court judge had transferred a seventeen-year-old to stand
trial on criminal charges because there was no presently
existing facility designed for the rehabilitation and treat-
ment of sophisticated hard-core juveniles. In remanding the
case to the juvenile court for further decision, the court
stated:
The crucial question... in this case is whether the
court may refer appellant for adult prosecution for the
reason that "no program exists or has been designed
which can rehabilitate Respondent, with adequate
protection for the public, prior to his twenty-first
birthday." In other words, is this reason sufficient to
sustain the conclusion that appellant "is therefore not
amenable to treatment as a juvenile and must be
transferred for prosecution as an adult?"
The court's decision to remand was based upon its
conclusion that
there can be no doubt but what our laws pertaining to
the Ireatment and commitment of juveniles, theoreti-
cally at least, are grounded on that theory that
appellant, and others like him have a right to
rehabilitative treatment.
Id. at 249 (emphasis added).
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statutory standards to point in conflicting directions.
For example, the state's attorney may contend that,
when taken together, the circumstances surrounding
the present offense and the minor's previous experi-
ences with juvenile court treatment programs suggest
that he is no longer amenable to rehabilitation at the
juvenile level. Defense counsel, on the other hand,
may call as a witness a psychologist who testifies that
the minor is a likely prospect for successful rehabili-
tation through treatment in ajuvenile court program
or institutional facility. Which of the statutory cri-
teria is to be determinative in such a situation? The
argument has been advanced that a juvenile court act
represents the existence of a presumption in favor of
juvenile treatment-a presumption which must be
clearly rebutted by competent evidence before a
transfer order can issue. 145
The criteria for decision-making which are enu-
merated in the statute may be of assistance to both
parties in preparing for a transfer hearing. It is
nevertheless apparent that these criteria are by no
means an exclusive catalogue of the elements which
make up a decision to transfer, because the court is
instructed to consider the six designated factors
"among others." Thus it is possible for the judge to
consider additional factors of his own choosing.
These subjective factors may have a profound influ-
ence on the judge's final decision. Without a state-
ment of the reasons explaining the transfer order, it
'5 A stout defense of the view that the presumption in
favor of juvenile court treatment must be clearly rebutted
before juvenile jurisdiction may properly be waived is found
in Haziel v. United States, 404 F.2d 1275 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
Judge Bazelon wrote:
"The essential scheme of the Juvenile Court Act is
... that non-criminal treatment is to be the rule-
and the adult criminal treatment, the exception
which must be governed by the particular factors of
individual cases." [citation omitted] The divide
between the Juvenile Court with its promise of
non-punitive rehabilitation and the harsher world of
the District Court is one not lightly to be crossed . . ..
Since the presumption of the statutory framework
is that juveniles are to be treated asjuveniles, the "full
investigation" required before waiver to the adult
court must explore all the possible dispositions short
of waiver by which the "welfare [of the child] and the
best interests of the District" [citation omitted] . . .
may be secured . . . . The trial judge in even an
adversary criminal trial has a responsibility to protect
the administration of justice. [citation omitted] ...
Far more is this true under the Juvenile Court Act,
where the parens patriae principle which justifies
some tempering of the adversarial nature of the
process reinforces the duty of the judge to insure that
the child receives the full benefits promised by the
statutory scheme.
Id. at 1278-79.
is impossible to ascertain whether the judge has
taken cognizance of subjective factors in arriving at a
decision. It also becomes difficult for counsel effec-
tively to prepare his client's case when he cannot
be certain of the criteria upon which the judge's de-
cision will be based.
Finally, and perhaps most significantly, the statute
is silent as to what, if any, evidentiary burden must
be met regarding the criteria at the transfer hearing.
There is no indication that the juvenile court judge is
obligated to hear evidence from both parties on each
and every one of the standards. The statute appears
to countenance the possibility that a transfer order
could issue without any evidence having been pre-
sented on one or more of the designated factors.
Neither is any indication given as to what kind of
testimony is to be presented at the hearing. The
statute allows for the admission of the opinions of a
non-expert witness, as well as for the admission of
hearsay. There is no indication of whether the state
bears the burden of presenting evidence to counter
specific contentions made on the juvenile's behalf,
particularly on the issue of the availability of treat-
ment at the juvenile court level.
In the only published appellate opinion thus far
available for a case arising under the new transfer
statute, the court of appeals rejected the contention
that the juvenile court judge was obligated to receive
evidence on the specific factors listed in the statute. In
People v. Banks 14 the fifteen-year-old defendant,
who had been convicted of armed robbery, argued
that his transfer hearing had been improper because
the court had no evidence before it regarding two of
the statutory standards: whether facilities were avail-
able within the juvenile system for his treatment and
rehabilitation, and whether his best interests
required prosecution as an adult. The appeals court
noted that under the statute, the courts were simply
required to "consider" the enumerated factors, not to
take evidence on them.
There is no specific requirement that detailed evidence
be taken on each, nor does the statute direct the judge
to weigh factors in a certain manner or achieve some
predesigned balance. . . . We do not read the statute
to require the judge to consider evidence beyond his
own knowledge of available facilities and his conclu-
sion as to the effectiveness of treatment of the particu-
lar minor in these facilities. 117
That the 1973 transfer . provision has largely
substituted the unchecked discretion of the judge for
4629 Ill. App.3d 923, 331 N.E.2d 561 (1975).
1
7 Id. at 926, 331 N.E.2d at 563.
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that of the prosecutor seems to be further substanti-
ated by the actual manner in which the transfer
hearing is conducted. A report of the Chicago Law
Enforcement Study Group, "48 based upon a study of
transfer proceedings in Cook County in 1973, con-
tained a description of a typical juvenile court
transfer hearing under the new statute.
The hearing begins with an inquiry into probable
cause (criterion 1), based upon the testimony of a
police officer. Frequently the arresting officer does
not personally appear-an investigator delivers an
account of probable cause, which is largely based
upon hearsay. Then a court official reads into the
record an account of the juvenile's prior brushes with
the law (criterion 4: "prior history"). The judge will
next ask questions of the probation officer, conclud-
ing by inquiring whether the officer knows of any
"facilities particularly available to the Juvenile
Court for the treatment and rehabilitation of the
minor" (criterion 5), and whether the officer has "an
opinion as to whether the best interest of the minor
and the security of the public may require that the
minor continue in custody or under supervision for a
period extending beyond his minority" (criterion
6). 149 At this point the state's case is usually con-
cluded and counsel for thejuvenile presents witnesses
on behalf of his client. The report observed that in
many instances, only character witnesses are called
to testify on the juvenile's behalf, and character
witnesses may only testify to his reputation in the
community. Occasionally experts will testify as to
their views of the juvenile's mental health and
amenability to juvenile rehabilitation. At the close of
the evidence the juvenile court judge rules on the
prosecutor's motion to transfer. It is merely granted
or dismissed. An explanation of the decision or a
statement of reasons is not offered.
The study group concluded that although the
proceeding is "loosely structured around the six
criteria specified in the statute,"' 50 "the manner of
consideration of each criterion is so superficial that
there is no basis for a meaningful transfer deci-
son."151 To illustrate the superficial quality of the
evidence, the report noted that consideration of the
child's past history is routinely limited to a simple
recitation of his juvenile court record. Evidence
regarding the availability of treatment and rehabili-
tation through the juvenile court is generally not
presented by psychologists or other trained personnel
1
8 




familiar with the operations of such programs and
facilities, but is instead elicited through the conclu-
sory opinions of a probation or parole officer who
generally lacks the professional training and exper-
tise to answer this question knowledgeably or mean-
ingfully. 52
The fundamental due process issue in juvenile
transfer is not whether or what particular standards
the legislature might prescribe to guide the process of
judicial decision-making. The ultimate issue is
whether the judge's ruling is based upon facts and
findings which establish that the decision was mean-
ingfully made. This cannot be assured by statutory
standards alone. The standards can best serve only to
augment more basic procedural guarantees.
The issue of statutory standards confronted the
Supreme Court of Michigan in the case of People v.
Fields."' Since 1939 the Michigan Probate Code""
had provided that where a minor was accused of
having committed a felony, the probate judge "after
investigation and examination" "'could waivejuris-
diction over the minor and order him to be trans-
ferred to stand trial in a court of general criminal
jurisdiction. Fields challenged the constitutionality
of the provision on the grounds that it contained no
standards to guide the judge in the exercise of his dis-
cretion. Although the statute was upheld by both the
trial court and the court of appeals, "' the state su-
preme court struck down the provision in 1972.
The court concluded that by allowing certain
juveniles to be excluded from the "beneficent proc-
esses and purposes of the juvenile courts,""117 the
legislature was in effect treating certain members of
".1Id. at 58.
"1'391 Mich. 206, 216 N.W.2d 51 (1954).
"'In Michigan, juvenile jurisdiction is vested in the
county probate court, and legislation relevant to such
jurisdiction is contained in the Michigan Probate Code.
"'At the time, the appropriate statutory provision
read:
In any case where a child over the age of 15 years is
accused of any act the nature of which constitutes a
felony, the judge of probate of the county wherein the
offense is alleged to have been committed may, after
investigation and examination, including notice to
parents if address is known, and upon motion of the
prosecuting attorney, waive jurisdiction; whereupon
it shall be lawful to try such child in the court having
general criminal jurisdiction of such offense.
[Mich.] Pub. Acts 1944, no. 54 [1944] (Ex. Sess.) as
amended by [Mich.] Pub. Acts 1946, no. 22 [1946] (Ex.
Sess.) (amended 1969 and 1972).
"'People v. Fields, 30 Mich. App. 390, 186 N.W.2d
15 (1971).
1"388 Mich. 66, 77, 199 N.W.2d 217, 222 (1972).
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the class of juveniles differently from others of the
same class. Therefore, the court held that
the Legislature must establish suitable and ascertaina-
ble standards whereby such persons are to be deemed
adults and treated as such subject to the processes and
penalties of our criminal law. 158
On rehearing, the court affirmed its earlier deci-
sion.' However, a thoughtful and well-reasoned
dissent was filed by Justice Charles Levin. The
dissent agreed with the majority that the issue before
the court was one relating to the proper exercise of
discretionary power. There was a "need to formalize
criteria outlining an ordered structure within which
discretionary power may be exercised."160 In the
absence of an articulated set of criteria for transfer
decision-making, none of the participants in the ju-
dicial process could be certain of the grounds on
which the decision was to be based.
The thrust of the dissent, however, was that the.
absence of legislative guidelines did not render the
statute per se unconstitutional. In Justice Levin's
view, the larger significance of Kent was not to be
found in the Supreme Court's concern for standards
in decision-making, but rather in the fundamental
emphasis which the Court had placed upon
the importance of judicial review and the need for a
supportive record and for specific, not pro forma, fact
finding as safeguards against haphazard or arbitrary
decision making. 1
The dissent considered these requirements to be
fairly well met under the challenged Michigan
transfer procedures. First, appellate review of trans-
fer decisions was statutorily available in Michi-
gan. 6' Second, state procedural rules required that a
statement by the judge of the facts and reasons
prompting his decision had to accompany a transfer
order. 1 3 Regarding standards for decision-making,
Justice Levin observed that the Michigan juvenile
158 1d.
"'9People v. Fields, 391 Mich. 206, 216 N.W.2d 52
(1974).
16/d. at 225, 216 N.W.2d at 58.
6"
1 Id. at 242, 216 N.W.2d at 66.
"'2An order waiving juvenile jurisdiction is appealable
by right to the circuit court. MIcH. C omip. LAWS § 712A.22
(1973).
' 'MIcH. Juv. CT. R. 11.6 provides:
If a waiver order is issued such order shall be
accompanied by or include a written statement of the
court setting forth findings forming the basis for entry
of the order.
court judiciary, over a fifty year period of experience
with the transfer process, had developed criteria to be
applied in arriving at transfer decisions. These
judge-made criteria had come to be law themselves in
the sense that, "like the rules of the common law,
[they] were handed down from one judge to an-
other." 164
The dissent concluded that the statutory enumera-
tion of standards, standing alone, "will not eliminate
errors in human judgment and in decision ma-
king." 165 Legislatively established standards were
not a sufficient procedural protection against "the
arbitrary exercise of power and unjustified discrimi-
nation in its administration." 166 The issue at the
heart of juvenile transfer was one of judicial discre-
tion, and Justice Levin found that:
The primary safeguards against abuse of discretion by
... judges . . . are the rights to an evidentiary
hearing after proper notice, to representation by
counsel and to judicial review upon a transcribed
record of the judge's decision elucidated with a
statement of facts found and reasons for decision. 16
Michigan procedures incorporated these due proc-
ess safeguards, and criteria for decision-making had
been developed by the judiciary over a fifty-year
period of experience in juvenile transfer proceedings.
The dissent concluded that there was therefore
nothing unsound in the Michigan transfer statute,
and that it was not constitutionally imperative that
legislative standards be included in the provision.
This reasoning suggests that the enumeration of
statutory standards for judicial decision-making is
not in itself an adequately protective guarantee
against procedural arbitrariness in juvenile transfer
proceedings. The essential protection against arbi-
trary judicial decision-making is appellate review,
and, to assure meaningful review, provision for a
judicial statement of reasons. Where a decision is left
in the hands of a single judge, the possibility of ap-
I" During the years. . . before this case arose, many
requests for waiver of jurisdiction were considered by
the probate judges of this state. Out of their decisions
criteria developed for the exercise of this power. Those
criteria, like the rules of the common law, were
handed down from one judge to another. In this
manner the criteria so developed came to be law. This
is the process by which the common law (and indeed a
great amount of statutory law, so much of which is
assimilative of the common. law) was formed.
391 Mich. at 235, 216 N.W.2d at 62 (Levin,J., dissenting).
16'Id. at 251, 216 N.W.2d at 70.
161 1d., 216 N.W.2d at 71.
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pellate review becomes an "all-important element in
the decision making process." 168 Where there is no
appellate review from a judicial decision, "the judge
becomes a monarch from whose ruling-good, bad or
indifferent-there is no recourse." 169
Unlike their Michigan counterparts, juvenile
court judges in Illinois have not had decades of prior
experience in making transfer decisions. To this end,
the formulation of criteria by the legislature may
indeed have been particularly appropriate in Illinois.
The Illinois legislature, however, has actually pro-
vided only one of the necessary components in the
package of procedural measures which protects
against arbitrariness in the juvenile transfer process.
Criteria to guide the exercise ofjudicial discretion are
essentially of little value unless they serve to comple-
ment the availability of appellate review.
Starting with People v. Jiles170 the Illinois
Supreme Court consistently held that appellate
review of transfer decisions was not available in
Illinois, and that, as a consequence, no statement of
reasons needed to be provided to explain the decision
to transfer. This rationale continued to be reiterated
by the appellate courts as they refuted subsequent
constitutional challenges to the 1967 transfer stat-
ute. 171
These prior decisions are completely undercut by
the 1973 transfer statute. The new statute, by
removing the transfer decision from the hands of the
prosecutor and resting it with a juvenile court judge
who is charged with conducting an investigation and
hearing, has effectively eliminated the fundamental
justification for the denial of appellate review.
Because transfer is now a judicial decision, appellate
review must now be made available to assure against
the unchecked exercise of judicial discretion.
Although a transfer order is "final" in the sense
that it spells a complete termination of all statutory
benefits and protections accorded under juvenile
court jurisdiction, it is not considered to be a "final
order" of the circuit court as a whole. A transfer
order works only a lateral removal from one division
to another within the same court. Since the transfer
order cannot be a final order, direct appeal prior to
the commencement of criminal court proceedings is
not available. Under the new statute, however, the
transfer order now represents the ruling of ajudge of
the juvenile division of the circuit court. Therefore,
'Id. at 216, 216 N.W.2d at 53. The language is taken
from the opinion of the court.
1"Id. at 216-17, 216 N.W.2d at 53.
...See text accompanying notes 111-14 supra.
" See text accompanying notes 115-34 supra.
on an appeal from a subsequent criminal conviction,
the transfer order is as open to challenge as the
rulings made by the judge who presides at the trial in
the criminal division. Although admittedly unwieldy
and hardly as expeditious as may be desired,'
72
under the 1973 statute opportunity for appellate
review on the merits of a transfer order is for the first
time available in Illinois.
The holding of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit in the Bombacino case is
similarly undercut. The federal appellate court had
ruled that due process did not require a statement of
reasons in transfer proceedings in Illinois. Heavy
reliance in Bombacino v. Bensinger 17 was placed
upon the files court's conclusion that there could be
no appellate review of a decision based upon prosecu-
torial discretion. Since the old statute "confined [the
judge] to supervising the exercise of prosecutorial
discretion," denial of a statement of reasons was not
considered fundamentally unfair because of the lim-
ited nature of the role of the judiciary "in this
case.' 1 74 Where the judiciary is now accorded full
decision-making authority under the new statutory
provision, a "different case" is presented, and Bom-
bacino cannot control. The very language of Bom-
bacino appears to imply that due process safeguards
are in fact required where transfer is a matter for
172It may be questioned whether this delayed form of
appellate review is sufficiently protective of a minor's right
to the protective benefits of the Juvenile Court Act. With-
out the availability of direct appeal from a transfer order,
a juvenile who is transferred by reason of a mistaken or
arbitrary decision will not be able to secure review until
after he has been exposed to criminal court jurisdiction.
This issue has arisen in connection with discussions of a
recent Ohio decision, In re Becker, 39 Ohio St. 2d 84, 314
N.E.2d 158 (1974). In Becker the Ohio State Supreme
Court held that there could be no direct appeal from. a
transfer order in Ohio because a transfer order was not
considered to be a final appealable order. (The court placed
heavy reliance on justice Schaefer'sfiles opinion in arriving
at its decision.) In a note critical of the Becker decision, a
commentator suggested that forcing a juvenile to wait to
obtain appellate review until after he has been convicted in
criminal court goes against the entire purpose of having a
separate juvenile court system. Such a delayed form of
appellate review, it was argued, is not sufficiently protective
of a minor's right to the advantages accorded him under the
Juvenile Court Act. Without the availability of direct ap-
peal from a transfer order, a juvenile who is transferred by
reason of mistake or arbitrariness is unable to secure review
until after he has been compelled to confront the very
system and procedures from which juvenile jurisdiction
seeks to shield him. Note, Juvenile Court and Direct Appeal
from Waiver of Jurisdiction in Ohio, 8 AKRON L. REv.
499, 518 (1975).
...See text accompanying notes 124-34 supra.
1"498 F.2d at 879.
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judicial decision: "procedural safeguards would not
be constitutionally required unless the state elected
to provide for judicial participation .. " '15 The
Illinois legislature has now provided for such partici-
pation by the judiciary.
With appellate review available, it becomes imper-
ative that the reviewing court be able to review. It
should not be "remitted to assumptions""16 regard-
ing the facts and reasons which entered into the
judge's decision to issue a transfer order. Nowhere in
the Illinois transfer process is provision made for a
statement of reasons to accompany a juvenile court
transfer order. Without it, procedural protection
against the abuse of judicial discretion cannot be
deemed to be adequate.
There are several possible options which may be
utilized to cure this defect in the Illinois transfer
procedure. The legislature, of course, can specifically
amend the statute to include a provision requiring a
judicial statement of reasons. State procedural rules
could be set forth which would require that a
statement of reasons accompany all transfer or-
ders. I" Or perhaps, as in the District of Columbia, 178
the juvenile court judges themselves could agree on a
set of guidelines which would require that a state-
ment of reasons for transfer to be provided.
The situation, however, could well be rectified by
judicial decision. In Kent the statutory standard of
"full investigation" was interpreted as requiring a
hearing and a judicial statement of reasons to assure
meaningful appellate reivew of transfer determina-
tions within the District of Columbia. Under the
present Illinois statute, the judge is similarly charged
with conducting an "investigation," as well as a
hearing, and there is an opportunity for appellate
review. It may well be argued that the current proce-
dure in Illinois now stands in such close proximity to
that of the District of Columbia that the full range of
Kent safeguards must logically be extended.
CONCLUSION
In light of Breed v. Jones179 a transfer hearing
may not become a full evidentiary hearing inquiring
into the juvenile's guilt or innocence. The transfer
1
75 Id. at 877 (emphasis added).
""See note 62 supra.
I This is the procedure adopted in Michigan. See note
163 supra.
" See the policy memorandum of the District of
CGlumbia juvenile court, discussed in text accompanying
notes 71-73 supra.
" See text accompanying note 96 supra.
decision therefore must necessarily be based upon the
informed discretion of the juvenile court judge.
Whether juvenile jurisdiction is waived or retained,
the proceedings which follow a transfer hearing may
well result in a deprivation of liberty. The fact that a
transfer hearing is an intermediate step towards the
possible end cannot justify according it a lower level
of procedural protection than exists in either deli-
quency proceedings or adult criminal processes.
Two separate interests are represented in every
transfer hearing: the interests of the minor and the
interests of society. The transfer hearing determines
whether the minor must forfeit the considerable
advantages and protections that are his as a matter of
right under the Juvenile Court Act. It has been noted
that the precise nature of society's interest in juvenile
transfer is often not recognized for what is truly is:
that what lies behind the transfer decision is not a
scientific determination of whether a youth can
respond to juvenile treatment but rather "society's
insistence on retribution or social protection." 18 In
the final analysis transfer represents a confrontation
between the juvenile's statutory right to be treated as
a juvenile, and the right of society to be protected
from him. Given the grave importance of these two
interests, it becomes imperative that a transfer
determination comport with recognized standards of
procedural regularity to insure against the possibility
of arbitrariness and abuse.
The Illinois transfer statute, though a well-mean-
ing attempt to bring the state's transfer procedure
into conformity with the requirements endorsed by
the United States Supreme Court in Kent v. United
States, has not gone far enough to assure an adequate
level of procedural protection. The primary advance
over the former statutory provision lies in the fact
that transfer in Illinois is now a matter for judicial
decision based upon investigation and hearing.
Under the present procedure, however, the hearing
may well be reduced to a recitation of the statutory
list of criteria to be considered in decision-making.
The criteria themselves are very loosely defined.
There is no statutory obligation for detailed evidence
to be taken on the individual criteria. The state is
under no burden to refute specific evidence which
might be presented on the juvenile's behalf regarding
his amenability to juvenile court treatment. As
written, the statute accords virtually unchecked
discretion to the juvenile court judge.
Review of the juvenile court judge's transfer
8 °TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 15, at 24.
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decision, though cumbersome, is now available for
the first time in Illinois. But the statute does not
provide that a statement of reasons must accompany
the judge's transfer order. Without such a statement
of reasons, the reviewing court may well be reduced
to making assumptions regarding the bases for the
transferring judge's decision. In light of the fact that
under the Illinois procedure appellate review may
not come until several years after the initial transfer
determination, it becomes all the more imperative
that the juvenile court judge's reasons for transfer be
clearly and timely expressed.
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